Game theory is extensively used in economics to predict the best strategies in an evolutionary process of buying/selling, bargaining or in stock market. Many game solvers in the literature use simulation or even experimental games (pay the players). In general simulation takes a huge time and experimental games are very expensive. In this paper, we model the 2 · 2 non-symmetric game and the 3 · 3 symmetric game as finite, state dependent quasi-birth-and-death processes. We propose solution procedures based on the block Gaussian elimination for the 2 · 2 game and the block Gauss-Seidel iteration method for the 3 · 3 game. Our solver is a powerful tool that gives a probability distribution on the set of strategies available in the game, which helps to identify the best strategies. Furthermore, our game solver is very effective in terms of time and cost. We provide some illustrative examples.
Introduction
Game theory is concerned with decision situations wherein one party is in conflict with another. Competitive situations arise in almost every facet of human activity--in parlor games, sports, military strategy, and business. In all of these situations, the results achieved depend on both our own action and that of our competitor. There are many features common to both simple games and complicated conflicts in business and industry. For this reason, knowledge of the theory of games should be helpful to the decision maker who continually faces competitive situations in business, industry, and government.
One way to describe a game is by listing the players (or individuals) participating in the game, and for each player, listing the alternative choices (called actions or strategies) available to that player. In the case of a two-player game, the actions of the first player form the rows, and the actions of the second player the columns, of a matrix. The entries in the matrix are two numbers representing the payoff to the first and second player, respectively. A very famous game is the PrisonerÕs Dilemma game. In this game the two players are partners in a crime who have been captured by the police. Each suspect is placed in a separate cell, and offered the opportunity to confess to the crime. The game can be represented by the following matrix of payoffs Note that higher numbers are better (more payoff). If neither suspect confesses, they go free, and split the proceeds of their crime which we represent by 5 units of utility for each suspect. However, if one prisoner confesses and the other does not, the prisoner who confesses testifies against the other in exchange for going free and gets the entire 10 units of utility, while the prisoner who did not confess goes to prison and gets nothing. If both prisoners confess, then both are given a reduced term, but both are convicted, which we represent by giving each 1 unit of payoff: better than having the other prisoner confess, but not so good as going free. This game has fascinated game theorists for a variety of reasons. It is a simple representation of a variety of important situations. Consider, for example, two wholesalers competing through their respective supermarket chains. Each fall they must decide on whether they will conduct a promotion campaign the following winter. The larger wholesaler attempts to formulate his decision problem in terms of a two-person game. From past records he knows that in general his chain handles 60% of what he at first considers a fixed segment of the business and his competitor 40%. If he conducts a promotion campaign and his competitor does not, he attracts business not only from his competitor, but also from the other independent stores, and the combined volume of these two major wholesalers is increased by 10 units, with his volume increased 30 units and the competitorÕs volume decreased 20 units. A similar relationship holds if the competitor is the only one to conduct a campaign. If both wholesalers conduct campaigns they both lose 10 units from their income under routine operations. The wholesaler decides to formulate the problem as a non-zerosum game. He uses as utility units the volume of business, measured in thousands of dollars, less the cost of a promotion campaign if such is conducted. The result is the following table, where his firm is represented by player 1. This is a two-person, non-zero-sum game of the prisonerÕs dilemma type. The ''promotion'' strategy of each player dominates the other strategy, and so the game has only one equilibrium This non-cooperative game does not yield optimal profits for the wholesalers. If they could mutually agree (cooperate) not to hold promotion campaigns in the winter, they could realize this advantageous payoff. Many authors have observed that traditional game theory imposes too severe restrictions on the information processing capacity of the players and on the degree of rationality, especially in playing games with a complicated strategic structure. As a consequence, attention has shifted to evolutionary games, by introducing learning processes. The evolutionary, population-dynamic view of games is useful because it does not require the assumption that all players are sophisticated and think the others are also rational, which is often unrealistic. Instead, the notion of rationality is replaced with the much weaker concept of reproductive success: strategies that are successful on average will be used more frequently.
Evolutionary game theory has extensive applications in many fields, such as business and biology. Excellent discussions are contained in [1, 2] . The last decade has seen a rapid literature on the subject. Foster and Young [3] added a new perspective by introduction a stochastic noise term in the evolutionary framework. Kandori et al. [4] characterized bounded rationality and learning by three points
• Inertia: not all players react instantaneously to their environment.
• Myopia: while players are learning, they are not taking into account the long run implication of their strategy choices.
• Mutation: there is a small probability that players change their strategies at random. Amir and Berninghaus [5] extended the model of Kandori et al. to continuous time. They considered a 2 · 2 symmetric game where an outside player is playing against a finite population. The population players switch from one strategy to another with transition rates function of average payoffs. They model the evolutionary process as a homogeneous Markov process with finite state space and derive its limiting distribution. Modelling games as Markovian processes is very interesting because it adds more convenience and simplicity to their study. It handles the above features such as inertia (sojourn times and transition times from one state to another are exponentially distributed) and myopia (players forget).
In the present paper, we use the same approach to analyze a 2 · 2 non-symmetric and a 3 · 3 symmetric games. The evolutionary process turns out to be in both cases a state dependent quasibirth-and-death (QBD) process with finite state space. Numerical approaches developed by Stewart [6] are used to derive the limiting distribution of the 2 · 2 and 3 · 3 games. Our solver is a powerful alternative to simulation and experimental games. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that QBD processes are used to model evolutionary games.
Section 2 describes the evolutionary models of the 2 · 2 non-symmetric and the 3 · 3 symmetric games. Section 3 summarizes relevant definition and results from Stewart [6] . In Section 4 the block Gaussian elimination and the block Gauss-Seidel iteration methods are adapted to solve the 2 · 2 and the 3 · 3 games, respectively. Examples and numerical results are given in Section 5. Concluding remarks and directions for further research end the paper in Section 6.
Evolutionary models
In this section we propose evolutionary models for the 2 · 2 non-symmetric and 3 · 3 symmetric games. As mentioned in Section 1, the evolutionary processes are state dependent QBD processes with finite state space.
The 2 Â 2 non-symmetric game
Consider two finite populations of respective sizes M and N playing a 2 · 2 non-symmetric game. The payoff matrix is given by:
The stochastic process of interest is defined as follows: At time t, let zðtÞ ¼ ðz 1 ðtÞ; z 2 ðtÞÞ where z i ðtÞ, i ¼ 1; 2, is the number of population i players who plan to play strategy 1. When playing the game, a payoff is associated with each choice of a strategy. According to (2.1), the average payoff of a population 1 player, when z population 2 players are adopting strategy 1, is Within a population, players switch from one strategy to another according to dynamics satisfying the bounded rationality characteristics of myopia, inertia, and mutation, as described by Amir and Berninghaus [5] , with rates being functions of the average payoffs of the strategies. The mutation property is introduced in the model by an error factor that allows the players to deviate with a small probability from the strategy they planned to choose (players make errors). In population 1, given that z 2 ðtÞ ¼ i, i.e., there are i population 2 players adopting strategy 1, a player switches from strategy 2 to strategy 1 with rate
and from strategy 1 to strategy 2 with rate Recall that for any real function f , f þ denotes the positive part of f , that is
2 ðiÞ P 0, strategy 1 income is larger than strategy 2 income and a population 1 player has incentive to switch from strategy 2 to strategy 1. On the other hand, if p 1 1 ðiÞ À p 1 2 ðiÞ < 0, strategy 1 income is smaller than strategy 2 income and a population 1 player is better off switching for strategy 1 to strategy 2. This motivates the rates (2.6) and (2.7). A similar motivation holds for the rates (2.8) and (2.9). The positive mutation term tends to zero. It is of great benefit to the model since it ensures ergodicity of the Markovian process. The boundary conditions in (2.6)-(2.9) merely mean that one cannot move to a ''full'' strategy or from an ''empty'' one.
The state space of the stochastic process zðtÞ (see Fig. 1 ) is S ¼ fz ¼ ðz 1 ; z 2 Þ : z i is the number of population i players adopting strategy 1g ¼ f0; 1; . . . ; Mg Â f0; 1; . . . ; N g. It is a rectangular lattice of cardinality jSj ¼ ðM þ 1ÞðN þ 1Þ. In order to write the generator of the process zðtÞ, we call level i, for i ¼ 0; . . . ; M, the set of states ði; jÞ, j ¼ 0; . . . ; N . Then the Q-matrix can be written as follows: The evolutionary process zðtÞ is a finite, state dependent QBD process, also called generalized quasi-birth-and-death (GQBD). GQBD processes are characterized by a Q-matrix of the type (2.10). A GQBD is a generalization of the QBD process whose Q-matrix has the following form: It was first studied by Evans [7] and Wallace [8] . The steady-state probabilities of QBD processes with countably infinite state space can be expressed in terms of the solution of a matrix quadratic equation [9] . Established results exist for infinite QBD processes but not for finite QBD processes. Some methods [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] have been proposed that can be applied under different constraints. For example, the method of De Nitto Persone and Grassi [15] , which can be applied to GQBD processes, requires that the A matrices have the same dimensions. Neuts [10] reports computational procedures based on an extension of the algorithm of Latouche and Ramaswami [16] to QBD processes with level dependence by Bright and Taylor [17] . Stewart [6] shows that recursive procedures are frequent subject to instabilities and proposes direct solution methods, the block Gaussian elimination and the block Gauss-Seidel iteration method, to obtain the stationary probability vector of block Hessenberg matrices. These methods are particularly suitable to our case and we apply them successfully.
The 3 Â 3 symmetric game
In this section we propose a model for the 3 · 3 symmetric game similar to the previous model. Because of the symmetry assumption, it is enough to consider an outside player playing against a single population of finite size N . The payoff matrix is given by ð2:12Þ
The stochastic process of interest is zðtÞ ¼ ðz 1 ðtÞ; z 2 ðtÞÞ where z i ðtÞ, i ¼ 1; 2, is the number of players who adopt strategy i at time t. The number of players adopting strategy 3 is then N À ½z 1 ðtÞ þ z 2 ðtÞ.
The payoff functions for the outside player are
Þc N for choosing strategy 1; ð2:13Þ
Þf N for choosing strategy 2; ð2:14Þ
Þi N for choosing strategy 3: ð2:15Þ
Given that z 1 ðtÞ ¼ i and z 2 ðtÞ ¼ j, a player switches from strategy k to strategy l ðl; k ¼ 1; 2; 3; l 6 ¼ kÞ with rate k kl ði; jÞ ¼ þ ½p k ði; jÞ À p l ði; jÞ þ ; ði; jÞ 6 ¼ fð0; NÞ; ð0; 0Þg and k kl ð0; N Þ ¼ k kl ð0; 0Þ ¼ 0;
ð2:16Þ
and from strategy l to strategy k ðl; k ¼ 1; 2; 3; l 6 ¼ kÞ with rate l kl ði; jÞ ¼ þ ½p l ði; jÞ À p k ði; jÞ þ ; ði; jÞ 6 ¼ fðN; 0Þ; ð0; 0Þg and l kl ðN ; 0Þ ¼ l kl ð0; 0Þ ¼ 0:
ð2:17Þ
The state space of the stochastic process zðtÞ (see Fig. 2 ) is S ¼ fz ¼ ðz 1 ; z 2 Þ : z i is the number of players adopting strategy ig. It is a triangular lattice of cardinality jSj ¼ :
ð2:18Þ
The matrices
The evolutionary process zðtÞ is again a finite, state dependent QBD. Because the block matrices A ij have different dimensions, a direct application of the block Gaussian elimination is no longer possible but application of the block Gauss-Seidel iteration method is possible.
Preliminaries [6]
For the sake of completeness, we reproduce, in this section, the definition of Hessenberg matrices and the two solution procedures that will be used to solve our two models: the block Gaussian elimination and the block Gauss-Seidel iteration method.
Block Hessenberg matrices
A block upper Hessenberg matrix has a finite block Hessenberg infinitesimal generator The diagonal blocks are square matrices of order n i , i ¼ 0; 1; . . . ; N ; the off-diagonal blocks Q ij , i 6 ¼ j, have dimensions ðn i Â n j Þ. All of the elements of all of the blocks of Q are non-negative except the diagonal elements which are all strictly negative. The sum of elements across any row of Q is zero. A matrix that is both block upper Hessenberg and block lower Hessenberg is block tridiagonal and is sometimes referred to as block Jacobi matrix.
Block Gaussian elimination
Assume that at the beginning of the jth block elimination step we have the following: where L i U i is an LU decomposition of H ii for i ¼ 0; 1; . . . ; j À 1. The jth step involves obtaining an LU decomposition of H jj and eliminating the non-zero elements in H jþ1;j . This is achieved by the operation
The total number of operation involved in the elimination phase is
þ OðNK 2 þ K 3 Þ, assuming that all blocks are of order K.
The backsubstitution phase requires a further ðN 2 K 2 þ 3NK 2 þ 2Þ=2 operations since the jth step of this phase involves computing x j from the relation
given that x N ; x N 1 ; . . . ; x jþ1 have already been found. Here, x ¼ ðx 0 ; x 1 ; . . . ; x N Þ is the (partitioned) stationary vector of the infinitesimal generator Q given by (3.1).
Block Gauss-Seidel iteration method
The infinitesimal generator matrix is written as The block Gauss-Seidel iteration method is equivalent to y ðlþ1Þ ¼ ðD À LÞ À1 Uy ðlÞ : ð3:9Þ
Models solution
As mentioned earlier, the block Gauss elimination is used to solve the 2 · 2 game and the block Gauss-Seidel iteration method is used to solve the 3 · 3 game.
Adaptation of the block Gaussian elimination to the 2 Â 2 game
Let p ¼ ðp i ; i ¼ 0; . . . ; jSjÞ denote the steady-state vector of probabilities. Partition it as x ¼ ðx 0 ; x 1 ; . . . ; x N Þ where each x i is ðN þ 1Þ Â 1.
Equations pQ ¼ 0, pe ¼ 1, where e denotes the jSj element column vector with each element equal to unity, become:
x 0 A 00 þ x 1 A 10 ¼ 0;
ð4:1Þ
The Q-matrix (2.10) is a block Jacobi matrix. To simplify the notation we rewrite it as follows: Since we wish to solve xQ ¼ 0, we write or in the present notation 
2. Form LU decomposition of A T N . 3. Apply the backsubstitustion phase.
Following the block Gaussian elimination, the resulting matrix has the form: The backsubstitution phase is then applied in the form
To perform each LU decomposition requires approximately ðK þ 1Þ 3 =3; each diagonal block update requires ðK þ 1Þ 2 þ KðK þ 1Þ. The total number of operations is thus approximately equal to NK 3 =3. The backsubstitution requires an additional NK 2 =2 operations.
Adaptation of the block Gauss-Seidel iteration method to the 3 Â 3 game
We need to solve iteratively the equation pP ¼ p, where P is a stochastic transition matrix P ¼ Q þ I, and I is the identity matrix of size jSj. Remark. In step 3, updating each sub-vector x k involves at most three small matrices: P kÀ1;k ; P kk ,and P kþ1;k which makes the cost per iteration very small. Usually the convergence rate of the block Gauss-Seidel is high and can be even higher, if blocks are reordered so that block i becomes block N À i.
Examples and numerical results
In this section we present some illustrative examples for both the 2 · 2 non-symmetric game and 3 · 3 symmetric game. In each example we start with a payoff matrix and compute the steady-state probabilities. In all the cases we take ¼ 0:1.
2 Â 2 Non-symmetric game
In a first example, consider the following payoff matrix Q ¼ ð1; À80Þ ð1; À100Þ ð0; 700Þ ð0; 300Þ
The steady-state probabilities are computed for M ¼ N ¼ 10 and M ¼ N ¼ 20. As seen on Table 1 , for M ¼ N ¼ 10, the states (10,0) and (10,0) have the highest probabilities, that is all population 1 players choose strategy 1 and all population 2 players choose strategy 2. We observe the same choices of strategies for M ¼ N ¼ 20. Evidently, these choices are the best choices for all players. Indeed, if a row player switches to strategy 2, he would get an outcome of 0 instead of 1 and if a column player switches from strategy 2, his outcome would change from )80 to )100. So no player has incentive to switch strategy. Outcome ()1, 80) is called risk dominant.
In a second example, consider the game with the following payoff matrix:
Q ¼ ð5; 3Þ ð0; 0Þ ð0; 0Þ ð3; 5Þ
This game has no risk dominant outcome but has two Nash equilibria (5,3) and (3, 5) and one would expect that each has the same probability of being selected. Table 2 shows that indeed outcomes (5,3) and (3, 5) have the highest probabilities of being chosen and these probabilities are the same both when M ¼ N ¼ 10 and M ¼ N ¼ 20.
3 Â 3 symmetric game
We present three examples of 3 · 3 symmetric games. We start with the following game, known as the prisonerÕs dilemma: Recall that in this case a row player is playing against N column players. For this game, Table 3 shows that the entire population chooses strategy 3 both for N ¼ 10 and N ¼ 20.
Next, we consider three pure coordination games, and compute steady-state probabilities. In the first game, for N ¼ 10, the payoff matrix is given by and as Table 4 shows, strategy 2 is selected by the entire population. and as Table 5 shows, the population is split between strategies 1 and 2.
In the third game, and as Table 6 shows, the population is split between all three strategies. 1,19) 0.0301 Table 4 Size States Probabilities 10 (0,10,0) 0.9346 (1, 9, 0) 0.0222 (0,9,1) 0.0207 Table 5 Size States Probabilities 10 (0,10,0) 0.4795 (10,0,0) 0.4795 (1, 9, 0) 0.0116 Table 6 Size States Probabilities 10 (0,10,0) 0.3171 (10, 0, 0) 0.3171 (0,0,10) 0.3171
Conclusion
In this paper, a finite, state dependent QBD process is suggested to model some evolutionary games. These models were solved using efficient numerical methods. In all cases, the results obtained were as expected. Further studies can be made on the choice of . On one hand, the numerical techniques may be sensitive to the value of . On the other hand, how would this value affect the dynamic behaviour of the game.
